Collective Probabilistic Judgements

DOI10.2307/1912050MaRDI QIDQ3674361zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Federico Valenciano, Salvador Barberà

Publication date 1983

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1912050

zbMATH Keywords

collective probabilistic judgementsdeterministic social choice rulespreference aggregationrandomizationstructure of decisive coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(10)

• On the independence from irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models
• On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions
• On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models
• The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures
• Salvador Barberà
• Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
• Social Choice Theory
• Sophisticated preference aggregation

This page was built for publication: Collective Probabilistic Judgements

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3674361)