Salvador Barberà
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Salvador Barberà (scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7452132)
Salvador Barberà (scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7452132)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3630437 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
- A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
- Balancing the power to appoint officers
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Collective Probabilistic Judgements
- Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
- Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Increasing Returns in General Non-Competitive Analysis
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
- Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
- Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
- On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
- On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
- Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
- Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
- Stable voting schemes
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Voting by Committees
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
- Voting under constraints
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