Salvador Barberà
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2064129
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_6zbMath1482.01014OpenAlexW4236729688MaRDI QIDQ2064129
Publication date: 5 January 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_6
Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70) Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)
Cites Work
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- Balancing the power to appoint officers
- On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
- Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
- Stable voting schemes
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Voting under constraints
- On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
- A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Voting by Committees
- Collective Probabilistic Judgements
- Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Increasing Returns in General Non-Competitive Analysis
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
