Salvador Barberà

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_6MaRDI QIDQ2064129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Carmen Beviá, Jordi Massó

Publication date 5 January 2022

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62769-0_6

zbMATH Keywords

interview

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70) Welfare economics (91B15)

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• A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
• A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
• Balancing the power to appoint officers
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Collective Probabilistic Judgements
• Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns
• Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
• Extending an order on a set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
• Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
• Implementability via protective equilibria
• Increasing Returns in General Non-Competitive Analysis
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• Manipulation of social decision functions
• Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
• Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
• Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
• On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
• Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
• Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
• Stable voting schemes
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
• Voting by Committees
• Voting by committees under constraints
• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
• Voting under constraints

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