Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
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Publication:1958948
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006zbMath1244.91034OpenAlexW2151470090MaRDI QIDQ1958948
Bernardo Moreno, Dolors Berga, Salvador Barberá
Publication date: 30 September 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.192.4836
strategy-proofnesssingle-peaked preferencesgroup strategy-proofnessseparable preferencessequential inclusion
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