Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
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Publication:1753138
DOI10.1007/s10898-017-0586-xzbMath1410.91204OpenAlexW2768645618MaRDI QIDQ1753138
Qiaoming Han, Yicheng Xu, Dong-lei Du, Da-Chuan Xu
Publication date: 25 May 2018
Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-017-0586-x
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