Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives

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Cites work

Arrow and Gibbard--Satterthwaite revisited. Extended domains and shorter proofs
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Voting by Committees

Cited in

(37)

On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
Immunity to credible deviations from the truth
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
Group support and top-heavy rules
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness
On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
Upper set rules with binary ranges
Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications
Robust group strategy-proofness
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation
Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
On the safety of group manipulation
A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions
On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization
Induced rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems: towards merge-proofness and coalitional stability
Robust group manipulation with indifferences
Two-valued strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions
Isotone classes of social choice functions with binary range
Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff
An impossibility result for strongly group-strategyproof multi-winner approval-based voting
Limited resoluteness and strategic voting: The case of linear sincere preference orderings
Group choice rules in problems with interpersonal preference comparisons

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