A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions

DOI10.3390/G13060078MaRDI QIDQ6105153zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Achille Basile, Anna De Simone, Ciro Tarantino

Publication date 26 June 2023

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g13060078

zbMATH Keywords

binary social choice functionsDedekind numbersindifferencemonotonicitystrategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
• A solution of Dedekind's problem on the number of isotone Boolean functions.
• Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
• Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
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• Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3552560 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences
• There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think

Cited in

(3)

• Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions
• Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
• On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization

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