Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
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Cites work
- Arrow and Gibbard--Satterthwaite revisited. Extended domains and shorter proofs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646588 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637541 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Voting by Committees
Cited in
(33)- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
- Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
- Upper set rules with binary ranges
- The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
- Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
- Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
- Voting by committees under constraints
- Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
- A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice
- Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
- Strategy-proof voting scheme under single-peak preference
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
- Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
- A note on binary strategy-proof social choice functions
- Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
- On strategy-proofness and single peakedness: a full characterization
- Two-valued strongly group strategy-proof social choice functions
- Isotone classes of social choice functions with binary range
- The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
- A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
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