scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646588
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Publication:3204946
zbMATH Open0415.90011MaRDI QIDQ3204946FDOQ3204946
Authors: Peter Gärdenfors 
Publication date: 1979
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
votingsocial choice functionsdefinitions of strategic manipulationmanipulation under all circumstancespotential manipulation
Cited In (24)
- Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Inferring probability comparisons
- Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions
- Signed orders and power set extensions
- A unifying impossibility theorem
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
- A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity
- On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
- Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
- Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models
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