Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies

DOI10.1007/S00199-021-01353-WMaRDI QIDQ2168539zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christian Basteck

Publication date 31 August 2022

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01353-w

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingBorda ruleiterated weak dominancemajoritarianismscoring rulessophisticated voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach
• Approval voting without ballot restrictions
• Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations

Cites work

• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Approval voting reconsidered
• Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
• Choosing from a tournament
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646588 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
• Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
• Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
• Scoring rules: an alternative parameterization
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(9)

• Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
• Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
• Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

This page was built for publication: Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2168539)