Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
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Publication:2452252
DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0602-XzbMATH Open1287.91047OpenAlexW2114453823MaRDI QIDQ2452252FDOQ2452252
Authors: Lucia Buenrostro, Amrita Dhillon, Péter Vida 
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269592/files/twerp698b.pdf
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Cites Work
- Condorcet's paradox
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Relative Utilitarianism
- Admissibility in Games
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
- Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
Cited In (15)
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
- Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
- Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- Bargaining through approval
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- Scoring rules: a cooperative game-theoretic approach
- Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
- Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
- Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
- The trembling chairman paradox
- New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
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