Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0602-XMaRDI QIDQ2452252zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lucia Buenrostro, Amrita Dhillon, Péter Vida

Publication date 2 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269592/files/twerp698b.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
• On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games

Cites work

• Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
• Admissibility in Games
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Condorcet's paradox
• Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance elimination procedures on finite alternative games
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Relative Utilitarianism
• Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(15)

• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games
• Voter coordination in elections: a case for approval voting
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
• Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
• Bargaining through approval
• Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
• Scoring rules: a cooperative game-theoretic approach
• Characterising scoring rules by their solution in iteratively undominated strategies
• Weak undominance in scoring rule elections
• Best reply dynamics for scoring rules
• The trembling chairman paradox
• New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting

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