Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
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Publication:2452252
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0602-xzbMath1287.91047MaRDI QIDQ2452252
Lucia Buenrostro, Péter Vida, Amrita Dhillon
Publication date: 2 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269592/files/twerp698b.pdf
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