Dominated strategies and common knowledge
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Publication:1189705
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4018807 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Agreeing to disagree
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Perfect and proper equilibria of large games
- Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
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- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
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- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
Cited in
(50)- Self-admissible sets
- An ordinal minimax theorem
- The computational complexity of weak saddles
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- Weak belief and permissibility
- The reasoning-based expected utility procedure
- Iterative information update and stability of strategies
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
- The epistemic structure of a theory of a game
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Responsive and strong responsive evolutionary dynamics
- The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
- Admissibility and assumption
- Dominance solvable English matching auctions.
- On the impossibility of surviving (iterated) deletion of weakly dominated strategies in rational MPC
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Common assumption of rationality
- Cautious belief and iterated admissibility
- Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
- The trembling chairman paradox
- On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
- Admissibility in Games
- Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
- Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
- Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
- Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
- Admissibility and common belief.
- The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game
- Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games
- Rationalizability and logical inference
- Strategy elimination in games with interaction structures
- Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
- Weak assumption and iterative admissibility
- On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- Order independence for iterated weak dominance
- A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- On the foundation of stability
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
- Dominance rationality: a unified approach
- Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
- Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450031 (Why is no real title available?)
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Knowledge and best responses in games
- A dynamic analysis of interactive rationality
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