Dominated strategies and common knowledge

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90020-SzbMath0749.90092OpenAlexW3122651218MaRDI QIDQ1189705

Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90020-s

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeadmissibilitydominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (46)

Responsive and strong responsive evolutionary dynamics ⋮ The epistemic structure of a theory of a game ⋮ The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint ⋮ Admissibility and assumption ⋮ Knowledge and best responses in games ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ Order independence for iterated weak dominance ⋮ Rationalizability and logical inference ⋮ Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ Weak belief and permissibility ⋮ The role of aggregate information in a binary threshold game ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ Weak assumption and iterative admissibility ⋮ Common assumption of rationality ⋮ Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium ⋮ Cautious belief and iterated admissibility ⋮ Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games ⋮ The reasoning-based expected utility procedure ⋮ Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes ⋮ On the complexity of iterated weak dominance in constant-sum games ⋮ The computational complexity of weak saddles ⋮ Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability ⋮ Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games ⋮ Iterated strict dominance in general games ⋮ Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility ⋮ ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance ⋮ A minimal logic for interactive epistemology ⋮ Comprehensive rationalizability ⋮ Iterative information update and stability of strategies ⋮ Self-admissible sets ⋮ Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information ⋮ Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games ⋮ An ordinal minimax theorem ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity ⋮ A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality ⋮ On the foundation of stability ⋮ Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance ⋮ The trembling chairman paradox ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance ⋮ Dominance solvable English matching auctions.

Cites Work

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• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games
• Agreeing to disagree
• Perfect and proper equilibria of large games
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

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