Recommendations
- Obligation, free choice, and the logic of weakest permissions
- On the Pareto condition on permissible belief
- Deontic reasoning with incomplete trust
- Evidence sensitivity in weak necessity deontic modals
- Weak pseudo-rationalizability
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 611098
- Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism
- Weak choice principles
- The Logic of Obligation as Weakest Permission
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 722611 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3434895 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1453152 (Why is no real title available?)
- Admissibility and common belief.
- Admissibility and event-rationality
- Admissibility in Games
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Fixed points in epistemic game theory
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Forward induction reasoning revisited
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- Iterated dominance revisited
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
- Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
- Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
- Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
- Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality
- On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Topology-free typology of beliefs
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
- When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
Cited in
(10)- Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
- Directed lexicographic rationalizability
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Cautious belief and iterated admissibility
- Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
- Admissibility and common belief.
- Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Iterated dominance revisited
- Possibility and permissibility
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