Weak belief and permissibility

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.11.007MaRDI QIDQ2178012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emiliano Catonini, Nicodemo De Vito

Publication date 7 May 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.007

zbMATH Keywords

rationalityepistemic game theorylexicographic probability systemsDekel-Fudenberg proceduretype structurespermissibilityinfinitely more likely

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 722611 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3434895 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1453152 (Why is no real title available?)
• Admissibility and common belief.
• Admissibility and event-rationality
• Admissibility in Games
• Comprehensive rationalizability
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Fixed points in epistemic game theory
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Forward induction reasoning revisited
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Iterated dominance revisited
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
• Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality
• On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Topology-free typology of beliefs
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?

Cited in

(10)

• Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
• Directed lexicographic rationalizability
• Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
• Cautious belief and iterated admissibility
• Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
• Admissibility and common belief.
• Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information
• Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
• Iterated dominance revisited
• Possibility and permissibility

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