Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
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Publication:6176754
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.007zbMath1521.91034MaRDI QIDQ6176754
Geir B. Asheim, Thomas Brunnschweiler
Publication date: 23 August 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
stochastic independenceperfect information gamesnon-Archimedean probabilitiesbackward induction paradox
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