The chain store paradox
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Publication:1245077
DOI10.1007/BF00131770zbMATH Open0374.90085OpenAlexW4232703759MaRDI QIDQ1245077FDOQ1245077
Authors: Reinhard Selten 
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00131770
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Cited In (69)
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- Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
- Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games
- Strategic irrationality in extensive games
- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Plausible equilibria and backward payoff-keeping behavior
- The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
- A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- On the contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten
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- Splitting multidimensional BSDEs and finding local equilibria
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games: An overview
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
- Self-admissible sets
- Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Investment timing and predatory behavior in a duopoly with endogenous exit
- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria
- A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games
- Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- New equilibria for noncooperative two‐person games
- Frustration, aggression, and anger in leader-follower games
- Stability and the chain store paradox
- Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games
- Sex and evolutionary stability
- Dynamic entry deterrence in the UK pathology services market
- Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
- The replicator equation and other game dynamics
- A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games
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- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
- The strength of a little perfection
- Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
- Optimal penalties for repeat offenders -- the role of offence history
- The chain-store paradox revisited
- Subgame monotonicity in extensive form evolutionary games
- Imperfect equilibrium
- Continuous time vs. backward induction
- Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one's chances of winning?
- Changing behaviour under unfairness: an evolutionary model of the ultimatum game
- A misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality
- Rule rationality
- Intentional time inconsistency
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games
- Information asymmetry and reentry
- Multiple rounds in a chain store game
- Reputation effects
- Theories and cases in decisions under uncertainty
- From the logical point of view: the chain store paradox revisited
- Generalized backward induction: justification for a folk algorithm
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