A misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality

DOI10.1007/s11238-022-09907-7zbMath1514.91031OpenAlexW4298395088WikidataQ114689232 ScholiaQ114689232MaRDI QIDQ6039542

Karl Sörenson

Publication date: 5 May 2023

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09907-7

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydeterrencebounded rationalitylevel-\(k\)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The chain store paradox
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Reasoning about others' reasoning
• Schelling, von Neumann, and the event that didn't occur
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

This page was built for publication: A misfit model: irrational deterrence and bounded rationality