A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8zbMath0883.90127WikidataQ57944323 ScholiaQ57944323MaRDI QIDQ1367854

Dieter Balkenborg, Eyal Winter

Publication date: 1 October 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfection; backward induction; common knowledge; extensive games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction, Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games, The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology, Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction, Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps, Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction, Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game, On the epistemic foundation for backward induction, Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games, Game logic and its applications. I

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