Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality

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Backward induction and common strong belief of rationality
From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
Publication:3483263
Substantive rationality and backward induction
Substantive rationality and backward induction
Proper rationalizability and backward induction
On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945
Rationalizability, observability, and common knowledge
On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability

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Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
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Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
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An epistemic logic of extensive games
Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information
Agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge
Logic and Game Theory
Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
On definitive solutions of strategic games
Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth
An epistemic characterization of MACA
Modeling reasoning in a social setting
Reasoning about games
On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
Computational ability in games: individual difference and dynamics
Preference dynamics in games with short sight
The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
Game theory with translucent players
Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
Choice-driven counterfactuals
Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation
Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information
On the centipede game
Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
Quantum version of Aumann's approach to common knowledge: sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree
Dominance rationality: a unified approach
Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
Sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria of linear strategies in risk-seeking insider trading
A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
Knowledge condition games
Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
Cycles of learning in the centipede game
Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
Mechanizing common knowledge logic using COQ
Probabilistic dynamic belief revision
Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas
Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
On expressing maximum information in extensive games
Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
A semi-potential for finite and infinite sequential games (extended abstract)
Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
Agent connectedness and backward induction
Uncertain information structures and backward induction
On the foundation of stability
Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction
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Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
A semi-potential for finite and infinite games in extensive form
Game logic and its applications. I
A logical characterization of extensive games with short sight
Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
Rational beliefs in rationalizability
Contextual mechanism design
A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
Why bother with syntax?
The predictive role of counterfactuals
The logic of backward induction
Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
Introduction: Special issue of ``Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey
Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
Possibility to agree on disagree from quantum information and decision making
Iterated strict dominance in general games
The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
A computational learning semantics for inductive empirical knowledge
On the centipede game with a social norm
Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
Rational play in extensive-form games
Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
The power of knowledge in games
Substantive rationality and backward induction
Substantive rationality and backward induction
Towards Syntactic Epistemic Logic
Static games
Common knowledge and limit knowledge
Allocating limited resources to protect a massive number of targets using a game theoretic model
Common knowledge logic in a higher order proof assistant
Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
Modeling of the learning process in centipede games
Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
Epistemic reasoning about rationality and bids in auctions
Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
Limited foresight equilibrium
Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
Differential game logic

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