Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80015-6zbMATH Open0833.90132OpenAlexW2075928479WikidataQ56482311 ScholiaQ56482311MaRDI QIDQ1890908FDOQ1890908

Authors: Robert J. Aumann 

Publication date: 28 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80015-6

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zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge of rationalitygame of perfect informationbackward induction outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited In (98)

• An epistemic logic of extensive games
• Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
• On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information
• Agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge
• Logic and Game Theory
• Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth
• Reasoning about games
• Preference dynamics in games with short sight
• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
• Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
• ``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation
• On the centipede game
• Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
• Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
• Dominance rationality: a unified approach
• Quantum version of Aumann's approach to common knowledge: sufficient conditions of impossibility to agree on disagree
• Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
• A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
• Knowledge condition games
• Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
• Cycles of learning in the centipede game
• Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
• Probabilistic dynamic belief revision
• Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
• Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
• Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
• Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
• A semi-potential for finite and infinite sequential games (extended abstract)
• A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
• From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
• Uncertain information structures and backward induction
• Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• On the foundation of stability
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game logic and its applications. I
• A semi-potential for finite and infinite games in extensive form
• Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
• Contextual mechanism design
• A logical characterization of extensive games with short sight
• Rational beliefs in rationalizability
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
• Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
• The logic of backward induction
• Introduction: Special issue of ``Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey
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• Allocating limited resources to protect a massive number of targets using a game theoretic model
• Common knowledge logic in a higher order proof assistant
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• Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
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• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
• Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
• Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
• Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
• On definitive solutions of strategic games
• On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
• Modeling reasoning in a social setting
• Computational ability in games: individual difference and dynamics
• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Game theory with translucent players
• Choice-driven counterfactuals
• Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information
• Sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria of linear strategies in risk-seeking insider trading
• Mechanizing common knowledge logic using COQ
• On expressing maximum information in extensive games
• Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas
• Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
• Agent connectedness and backward induction
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
• Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
• Why bother with syntax?
• Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
• The predictive role of counterfactuals
• The power of knowledge in games
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• Static games
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• Modeling of the learning process in centipede games
• Differential game logic
• Limited foresight equilibrium

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