Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1890908)
Recommendations
- Backward induction and common strong belief of rationality
- From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4154411
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- Proper rationalizability and backward induction
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945
- Rationalizability, observability, and common knowledge
- On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
Cites work
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 52527 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795170 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3302001 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3195782 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Knowledge condition games
- Probabilistic dynamic belief revision
- On the foundation of stability
- Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
- The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- On the centipede game
- Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
- Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- Chess-like games are dominance solvable in at most two steps
- Game theory with translucent players
- Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
- Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing
- Computational ability in games: individual difference and dynamics
- Sequential fair Stackelberg equilibria of linear strategies in risk-seeking insider trading
- Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
- Common knowledge and limit knowledge
- The predictive role of counterfactuals
- Cycles of learning in the centipede game
- Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
- Modeling reasoning in a social setting
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Epistemic reasoning about rationality and bids in auctions
- Limited foresight equilibrium
- Choice-driven counterfactuals
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing
- A semi-potential for finite and infinite games in extensive form
- Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
- Strategic reasoning: building cognitive models from logical formulas
- Dominance rationality: a unified approach
- Allocating limited resources to protect a massive number of targets using a game theoretic model
- Possibility to agree on disagree from quantum information and decision making
- Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction
- A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction
- Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information
- Introduction: Special issue of ``Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey
- Game logic and its applications. I
- Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
- Mechanizing common knowledge logic using COQ
- On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information
- Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
- Preference dynamics in games with short sight
- An epistemic logic of extensive games
- Agent connectedness and backward induction
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- Agreeing to disagree with limit knowledge
- Why bother with syntax?
- Rational beliefs in rationalizability
- On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5734945 (Why is no real title available?)
- From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
- Degrading network capacity may improve performance: private versus public monitoring in the Braess paradox
- On the centipede game with a social norm
- Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
- Common knowledge logic in a higher order proof assistant
- A semi-potential for finite and infinite sequential games (extended abstract)
- Towards Syntactic Epistemic Logic
- Contextual mechanism design
- Static games
- Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games
- A computational learning semantics for inductive empirical knowledge
- Logic and Game Theory
- On definitive solutions of strategic games
- Differential game logic
- The power of knowledge in games
- Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth
- Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information
- On expressing maximum information in extensive games
- Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- Reasoning about games
- Modeling of the learning process in centipede games
- Modal semantics for reasoning with probability and uncertainty
- Computing Nash equilibria of unbounded games
- The topology of surprise
- Conditional hypothesis testing systems
- Extension of backward induction for the enumeration of pure Nash equilibria outcomes
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
- Substantive rationality and backward induction
- Beyond knowledge of the model
- ``Backward coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the rationality of escalation
- The material conditional is sufficient to model deliberation
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
- Video streaming wars: content production strategies for streaming platforms
This page was built for publication: Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1890908)