Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
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Publication:1890908
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80015-6zbMath0833.90132OpenAlexW2075928479WikidataQ56482311 ScholiaQ56482311MaRDI QIDQ1890908
Publication date: 28 May 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80015-6
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- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
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