Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge

DOI10.1007/BF01048618MaRDI QIDQ1903085zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Cristina Bicchieri, Gian Aldo Antonelli

Publication date 13 May 1996

Published in Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01048618

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeperfect informationtheory revisionbackwards induction elquilibriumfinite, extensive form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Knowledge representation (68T30) Game theory (91A99)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795170 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agreeing to disagree
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games

Cited in

(10)

• On expressing maximum information in extensive games
• Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information
• Some notes on Church's thesis and the theory of games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4154411 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795170 (Why is no real title available?)
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
• From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
• Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
• The power of knowledge in games

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