Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge

DOI10.1007/BF01048618zbMATH Open0837.90148OpenAlexW2068479477WikidataQ114694099 ScholiaQ114694099MaRDI QIDQ1903085FDOQ1903085

Authors: Cristina Bicchieri, Gian Aldo Antonelli 

Publication date: 13 May 1996

Published in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01048618

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zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeperfect informationtheory revisionbackwards induction elquilibriumfinite, extensive form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Knowledge representation (68T30) Game theory (91A99)

Cites Work

• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Agreeing to disagree
• On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (10)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Knowing and supposing in games of perfect information
• Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• On expressing maximum information in extensive games
• From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
• Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
• The power of knowledge in games
• Some notes on Church's thesis and the theory of games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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