From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction

DOI10.1142/S0219198903000933zbMath1086.91011OpenAlexW2167700373MaRDI QIDQ4474567

Antonio Quesada

Publication date: 12 July 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903000933

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge of rationalityBackward inductionforward knowledge of rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items

Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction ⋮ Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction

Cites Work

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• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction