From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction

DOI10.1142/S0219198903000933MaRDI QIDQ4474567zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antonio Quesada

Publication date 12 July 2004

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903000933

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge of rationalityBackward inductionforward knowledge of rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
• Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction
• Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning
• Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• On the centipede game
• Substantive rationality and backward induction

Cited in

(24)

• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
• Backward induction and common strong belief of rationality
• An epistemic logic of extensive games
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• Uncertain information structures and backward induction
• Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
• The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
• Common knowledge of rationality in extensive games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795168 (Why is no real title available?)
• The logic of backward induction
• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
• Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4154411 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795170 (Why is no real title available?)
• Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Rationalizability and logical inference
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795156 (Why is no real title available?)
• Proper rationalizability and backward induction

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