From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction

DOI10.1142/S0219198903000933zbMATH Open1086.91011OpenAlexW2167700373MaRDI QIDQ4474567FDOQ4474567

Authors: Antonio Quesada 

Publication date: 12 July 2004

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903000933

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zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge of rationalityBackward inductionforward knowledge of rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
• On the centipede game
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
• Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
• Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning
• Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
• Branching time, perfect information games, and backward induction
• A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

Cited In (18)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
• Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction
• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
• The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
• Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information
• Substantive rationality and backward induction
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• Proper rationalizability and backward induction
• Common knowledge of rationality in extensive games

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