A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality

DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1006MaRDI QIDQ1317339zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Barton L. Lipman

Publication date 24 March 1994

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1994.1006

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitycommon knowledgemutual knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cited in

(32)

• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• On the concepts of rationalizability in games
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
• On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Rationalizability in general situations
• Epistemic foundations for set-algebraic representations of knowledge
• Collective, universal, and joint rationality
• Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
• Common Knowledge and State-Dependent Equilibria
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795168 (Why is no real title available?)
• The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
• Rationalizability in continuous games
• Learning to agree over large state spaces
• Common knowledge and limit knowledge
• Rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
• Iterated bounded dominance
• From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models
• Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté
• Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841932 (Why is no real title available?)
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
• Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information
• Iterated elimination procedures

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