The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2344949
DOI10.3390/g1040381zbMath1311.91042arXiv1010.5595MaRDI QIDQ2344949
Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan Alexander Zvesper
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1010.5595
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AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE, Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games, Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis, On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules, Rationalizability in general situations, A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality
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