The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games

DOI10.3390/G1040381MaRDI QIDQ2344949zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan Alexander Zvesper

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1010.5595

zbMATH Keywords

arbitrary gamesmonotonicityTarski's fixpoint theoremtrue common beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Abstract: It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem.

Review text

Summary: It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski's fixpoint theorem.

Recommendations

• A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs
• The Many Faces of Rationalizability
• Dominance rationality: a unified approach
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Proof-theoretic analysis of rationality for strategic games with arbitrary strategy sets

Cites work

• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Admissibility in Games
• Agreeing to disagree
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• General systems and -stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments
• Intrinsic correlation in games
• Iterated strict dominance in general games
• Knowledge spaces with arbitrarily high rank
• On the evaluation of solution concepts
• RATIONAL DYNAMICS AND EPISTEMIC LOGIC IN GAMES
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The Many Faces of Rationalizability

Cited in

(15)

• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
• Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: a qualitative analysis
• Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
• On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
• Dominance rationality: a unified approach
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• Rationalizability in general situations
• Fixed points in epistemic game theory
• A dynamic analysis of interactive rationality
• The Many Faces of Rationalizability
• Proof-theoretic analysis of rationality for strategic games with arbitrary strategy sets
• Strategy elimination in games with interaction structures
• A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs
• AN EPISTEMIC RATIONALE FOR ORDER INDEPENDENCE
• Possibilistic beliefs in strategic games

This page was built for publication: The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2344949)