The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0586-6zbMATH Open1287.91069OpenAlexW2152447915MaRDI QIDQ2452137FDOQ2452137

Olivier Bochet, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6

Recommendations

• Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• Monotone strategyproofness
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
• Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
• Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
• The role of monotonicity in the epistemic analysis of strategic games
• A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences

Cited In (16)

• On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
• Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
• Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
• Monotone strategyproofness
• Non-bossiness
• Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
• The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
• Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
• Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
• Influence in private-goods allocation
• Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness

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