The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
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Publication:2452137
Recommendations
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- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences
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- A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
Cites work
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
- Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
- Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
Cited in
(20)- The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information
- Influence in private-goods allocation
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals
- Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
- Non-bossiness
- Monotone strategyproofness
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
- Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness
- Monotonicity, implementation and generalized strategy-proofness
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
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