The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
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Publication:2452137
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6zbMath1287.91069MaRDI QIDQ2452137
Publication date: 30 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0586-6
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On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness, Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals, Non-bossiness, Influence in private-goods allocation, Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness, On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference, The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach, Collective choice rules on restricted domains based on a priori information, Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts, Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences, Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
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