On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result

DOI10.1007/S003550200169MaRDI QIDQ2568786zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Koji Takamiya

Publication date 19 October 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200169

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08)

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Cited in

(13)

• Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
• Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and maskin monotonicity are equivalent
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proof coalition formation
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
• Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
• On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
• A necessary and sufficient condition for weak Maskin monotonicity in an allocation problem with indivisible goods
• The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity
• Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities

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