Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems

DOI10.1111/IJET.12321MaRDI QIDQ6074889zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bettina Klaus

Publication date 19 October 2023

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

strict coremultiple-type housing market problemsstrict strong Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
• The core for housing markets with limited externalities
• Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Centralized allocation in multiple markets
• Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
• On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
• On cores and indivisibility
• On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: a converse result
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria
• On the existence of strong Nash equilibria
• Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
• Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strong equilibrium in congestion games
• Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
• The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(4)

• Top trading cycles
• Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
• The core for housing markets with limited externalities
• Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies

This page was built for publication: Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6074889)