Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
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Publication:6074889
DOI10.1111/IJET.12321zbMATH Open1530.91244MaRDI QIDQ6074889FDOQ6074889
Authors: Bettina Klaus 
Publication date: 19 October 2023
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
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Individual preferences (91B08) Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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