The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
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Publication:932763
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.05.013zbMATH Open1142.91646OpenAlexW2096808761MaRDI QIDQ932763FDOQ932763
Authors: Bettina Klaus 
Publication date: 11 July 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/967333/guid-2277ef84-ca5b-4d93-bfbb-de1aba0d0c74-ASSET1.0.pdf
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Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
Cited In (14)
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
- Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
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