Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0zbMath1285.91066MaRDI QIDQ2434962

Hiroo Sasaki, Hidekazu Anno

Publication date: 3 February 2014

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0732-0

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofness; single-peaked preference; generalized uniform rule; second-best efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B08: Individual preferences

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

On the operation of multiple matching markets, Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects, A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies, Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size, Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement, A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

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