Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
This article studies resource allocation problems in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities where preferences are single-peaked, in the context of obtaining strategy-proof allocation rules. The authors begin with a description of the inherent incompatibility between Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness and non-dictatorship. They then proceed to investigate the possible existence of rules that are not Pareto-efficient as such, but are not Pareto-dominated by any other set of rules that is strategy-proof. They derive one such egalitarian rule and prove its existence and properties in an extensive appendix to the paper.
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- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
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- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
- A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
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