Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01216-5zbMath1450.91018OpenAlexW2966798106MaRDI QIDQ2205993

Yan Long

Publication date: 21 October 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01216-5

zbMATH Keywords

worst-case analysisbudget balancemultiple-object assignmentranking mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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