Robust trading mechanisms
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1087124
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90104-9zbMath0609.90015MaRDI QIDQ1087124
Kathleen M. Hagerty, William P. Rogerson
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90104-9
private information; dominant strategy; posted-price mechanisms; single buyer and seller; trading institution
91B60: Trade models
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Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
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- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
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- Unnamed Item
