Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms
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Publication:6130328
DOI10.1007/s00453-023-01191-3OpenAlexW4389683123MaRDI QIDQ6130328
Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski
Publication date: 2 April 2024
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-023-01191-3
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