Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
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Publication:5393880
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00649.xzbMath1112.91023OpenAlexW2138444841MaRDI QIDQ5393880
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Martin W. Cripps
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4666156000000000329.pdf
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