Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.01.004zbMath1393.91093OpenAlexW2790599363WikidataQ125799783 ScholiaQ125799783MaRDI QIDQ1642157

Soumendu Sarkar

Publication date: 20 June 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

budget balanceVCG mechanismgraph structuressellersland acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Optimal mechanism for land acquisition ⋮ Assembly Problems

Cites Work

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