scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748496

MaRDI QIDQ4530374zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sushil Bikhchandani, Sven De Vries, James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date 26 June 2003

zbMATH Keywords

Vickrey auctionduality in linear programmingsealed bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(15)

• Combinatorial auctions
• Towards fast Vickrey pricing using constraint programming
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• Mechanism design for land acquisition
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Buyer-supplier games: optimization over the core
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• Iterative auction design for tree valuations
• Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
• Efficient advert assignment
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions

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