scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748496

zbMATH Open1012.91019MaRDI QIDQ4530374FDOQ4530374

Sven De Vries, Rakesh V. Vohra, James Schummer, Sushil Bikhchandani

Publication date: 26 June 2003

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

Vickrey auctionduality in linear programmingsealed bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (15)

• Combinatorial auctions
• Towards fast Vickrey pricing using constraint programming
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
• Mechanism design for land acquisition
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• Buyer-supplier games: optimization over the core
• Efficient advert assignment
• Bounding the payment of approximate truthful mechanisms
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations

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