Ascending price Vickrey auctions

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00141-6zbMath1125.91040MaRDI QIDQ2506307

Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ostroy

Publication date: 28 September 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

linear programming; primal-dual algorithm; multi-object auctions; Walrasian equilibrium; assignment model; buyers are substitutes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C90: Applications of mathematical programming

90C47: Minimax problems in mathematical programming

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Efficient market-clearing prices in markets with nonconvexities, Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming, Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items, Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations, The strategy structure of some coalition formation games, Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions, An efficient ascending auction for private valuations, A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation, Position auctions with multi-unit demands, Auction Design for the Efficient Allocation of Service Capacity Under Congestion

Cites Work

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