On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748496 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3793772 (Why is no real title available?)
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- The Lagrangian Relaxation Method for Solving Integer Programming Problems
- The package assignment model.
Cited in
(42)- Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
- Core pricing in combinatorial exchanges with financially constrained buyers: computational hardness and algorithmic solutions
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
- Combinatorial auctions
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
- Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
- Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- Coordination of manufacturing and engineering activities during product transitions
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- The ascending auction with flexible reporting
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
- Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges
- An extension of Ausubel's auction for heterogeneous discrete goods
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748496 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simplified analysis of the ascending auction to sell a matroid base
- Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- An ascending Vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid
- Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- Iterative auction design for tree valuations
- On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
- A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- On Vickrey-type auction procedures
- Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
- Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- Tâtonnement in matching markets
- First price package auction with many traders
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
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