On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
From MaRDI portal
Publication:869853
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010zbMath1142.91474MaRDI QIDQ869853
Sven de Vries, James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
Related Items
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts, Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity, Auction design with costly preference elicitation, Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model, Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items, Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations, Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions, On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions, A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions, Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions, Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support, Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time, Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study, Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case, Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions, Combinatorial auctions, Ascending price Vickrey auctions, Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions, Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The English auction with differentiated commodities
- The package assignment model.
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- The Lagrangian Relaxation Method for Solving Integer Programming Problems
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
