On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.07.010zbMATH Open1142.91474OpenAlexW2116764051MaRDI QIDQ869853FDOQ869853
James Schummer, Sven De Vries, Rakesh V. Vohra
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)
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Cited In (36)
- Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
- Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
- Combinatorial auctions
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
- Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
- Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature
- Coordination of manufacturing and engineering activities during product transitions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
- Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
- Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges
- Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
- Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
- Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions
- Ascending price Vickrey auctions
- On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
- A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
- Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
- On Vickrey-type auction procedures
- Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
- Position auctions with multi-unit demands
- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
- First price package auction with many traders
- Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
- Auction design with costly preference elicitation
- A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions
- Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations
- Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
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