Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/J.COR.2009.09.003zbMATH Open1178.90289OpenAlexW2139217167MaRDI QIDQ2655643FDOQ2655643

Authors: Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang 

Publication date: 25 January 2010

Published in: Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3967325

Recommendations

• Revealed preference and activity rules in dynamic auctions
• Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Combinatorial auction design
• Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions

zbMATH Keywords

biddingcombinatorial auctionsactivity rulesbudget-constrained biddersutility-preference: theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Combinatorial auction design
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

Cited In (4)

• The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP
• Auction Design for the Efficient Allocation of Service Capacity Under Congestion
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
• Revealed preference dimension via matrix sign rank

Uses Software

• CABOB

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