Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/J.COR.2009.09.003MaRDI QIDQ2655643zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang

Publication date 25 January 2010

Published in Computers \& Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3967325

zbMATH Keywords

biddingcombinatorial auctionsactivity rulesbudget-constrained biddersutility-preference: theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

• Revealed preference and activity rules in dynamic auctions
• Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Combinatorial auction design
• Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions

Cites work

• A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions
• Combinatorial auction design
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

Cited in

(5)

• Revealed preference and activity rules in dynamic auctions
• Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion
• Revealed preference dimension via matrix sign rank
• Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
• The combinatorial world (of auctions) according to GARP

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• CABOB

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