Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
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Publication:1691348
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.027zbMath1393.91116OpenAlexW1956513211MaRDI QIDQ1691348
Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Tommy Andersson
Publication date: 16 January 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp15_18.pdf
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Cites Work
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