Auction design without quasilinear preferences
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Publication:4682753
DOI10.3982/TE1951zbMath1396.91227MaRDI QIDQ4682753
Publication date: 19 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Individual preferences (91B08)
Related Items (14)
Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods ⋮ Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders ⋮ Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions ⋮ Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs ⋮ Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule ⋮ Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity ⋮ Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
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