Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.009MaRDI QIDQ2416630zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Michael Richter

Publication date 24 May 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationmechanism designwelfare maximizationbudget constraintscontinuum economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427 (Why is no real title available?)
• Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents
• Auction design without quasilinear preferences
• Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• First‐price auctions with budget constraints
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Revenue maximizing envy-free fixed-price auctions with budgets
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Strategy-proofness in the large
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

Cited in

(6)

• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
• Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments
• Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
• Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents

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