Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.009zbMATH Open1411.91131OpenAlexW2913585744WikidataQ128393092 ScholiaQ128393092MaRDI QIDQ2416630FDOQ2416630

Authors: Michael Richter 

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.009

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zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationmechanism designwelfare maximizationbudget constraintscontinuum economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Optimal Auction Design
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Auction design without quasilinear preferences
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
• Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents
• Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Strategy-proofness in the large
• First‐price auctions with budget constraints
• Revenue maximizing envy-free fixed-price auctions with budgets

Cited In (6)

• Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
• Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents
• Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
• Mechanism Design with Set-Theoretic Beliefs
• Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments

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