Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

DOI10.3982/TE3907MaRDI QIDQ5164525zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yunan Li

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3907

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymechanism designbudget constraintscostly verification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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