Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

DOI10.3982/TE3907zbMATH Open1475.91054OpenAlexW3186080518MaRDI QIDQ5164525FDOQ5164525

Authors: Yunan Li 

Publication date: 11 November 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3907

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymechanism designbudget constraintscostly verification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cited In (15)

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