Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1446MaRDI QIDQ3398220zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jesse Bull

Publication date 26 September 2009

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1446

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
• Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Mechanism design with approximate valuations
• Mechanism design with strategic mediators
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Bayesian Mechanism Design
• Budget feasible mechanism design, from prior-free to Bayesian
• Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments

Cites work

• Evidence disclosure and verifiability

Cited in

(6)

• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
• Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
• Implementation with evidence
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Hard evidence and mechanism design

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