Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2466858
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.05.005zbMath1150.91003OpenAlexW2169382366MaRDI QIDQ2466858
Publication date: 16 January 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.05.005
Related Items
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Combinatorial auctions without money ⋮ Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes ⋮ Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design
- Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
- Contracting Between Two Parties with Private Information