Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.09.002MaRDI QIDQ2016253zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic mechanism designgame theorytransferable utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies

Cites work

• A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
• A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable
• Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
• Exact and Approximate Algorithms for Scheduling Nonidentical Processors
• Frugal path mechanisms
• Frugality in path auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1754639 (Why is no real title available?)
• Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation through bribes
• Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
• New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Scheduling without payments
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (extended abstract)
• STACS 2005
• The power of verification for one-parameter agents
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity

Cited in

(20)

• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
• The anarchy of scheduling without money
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location
• Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
• The anarchy of scheduling without money
• Heterogeneous facility location without money
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Mechanisms with monitoring for truthful RAM allocation
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
• Combinatorial auctions without money
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification yielding optimal solutions
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
• On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case
• Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms without money for scheduling
• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains

This page was built for publication: Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2016253)