Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.09.002zbMATH Open1296.91130OpenAlexW1990326103MaRDI QIDQ2016253FDOQ2016253

Carmine Ventre, Paolo Penna

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryalgorithmic mechanism designtransferable utilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
• Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable
• Exact and Approximate Algorithms for Scheduling Nonidentical Processors
• Manipulation through bribes
• Incentives in Teams
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• The power of verification for one-parameter agents
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions
• Scheduling without Payments
• STACS 2005
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
• Multi-bidding Strategy in Sponsored Keyword Auction
• A Lower Bound of 1 + φ for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms
• New Constructions of Mechanisms with Verification
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness
• Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions
• Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
• A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
• Frugal path mechanisms
• Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines

Cited In (14)

• The anarchy of scheduling without money
• Heterogeneous facility location without money
• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments
• A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling
• Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location
• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
• Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation
• Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case
• Combinatorial auctions without money
• The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money

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