Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_59zbMath1158.68332OpenAlexW1708449488MaRDI QIDQ5900469

Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2008 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_59

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Distributed systems (68M14) Network protocols (68M12) Distributed algorithms (68W15)

Related Items (5)

Scheduling without payments ⋮ Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification ⋮ Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification ⋮ Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

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