Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_59zbMath1158.68332MaRDI QIDQ5900469

Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre

Publication date: 25 November 2008

Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2008 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_59

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

68M14: Distributed systems

68M12: Network protocols

68W15: Distributed algorithms

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