Improved Lower Bounds for Non-utilitarian Truthfulness

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-77918-6_2zbMath1130.91325OpenAlexW2122091367MaRDI QIDQ5443369

Iftah Gamzu

Publication date: 20 February 2008

Published in: Approximation and Online Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77918-6_2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Social choice (91B14) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Related Items (5)

On designing truthful mechanisms for online scheduling ⋮ Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification ⋮ Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification ⋮ Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

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