A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing

DOI10.1007/s00446-005-0122-yzbMath1264.68215MaRDI QIDQ1953638

Joan Feigenbaum, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Rahul Sami, Scott J. Shenker

Publication date: 7 June 2013

Published in: Distributed Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-005-0122-y

zbMATH Keywords

distributed algorithms; mechanism design; interdomain routing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems

68W15: Distributed algorithms

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