Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands
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Publication:1678765
DOI10.1007/s00224-012-9435-yzbMath1380.91030OpenAlexW2178195639MaRDI QIDQ1678765
Ameya Hate, Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar
Publication date: 7 November 2017
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-012-9435-y
Cites Work
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- Frugal path mechanisms
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Interdomain Routing and Games
- Incentive-Compatible Interdomain Routing with Linear Utilities
- Bertrand Competition in Networks
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