A network pricing game for selfish traffic

DOI10.1007/s00446-006-0020-yzbMath1266.91005MaRDI QIDQ1954204

Tom Wexler, Ara Hayrapetyan, Éva Tardos

Publication date: 20 June 2013

Published in: Distributed Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00446-006-0020-y

zbMATH Keywords

game theory; price of anarchy; network pricing games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91Axx: Game theory

68M11: Internet topics

Related Items

Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators, Network investment games with Wardrop followers, Strategic pricing in next-hop routing with elastic demands, Toll caps in privatized road networks, Constraint games for stable and optimal allocation of demands in SDN, A unifying approximate potential for weighted congestion games, The Cost of Free Spectrum, Price competition with elastic traffic

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