Selfish traffic allocation for server farms

DOI10.1145/509907.509952zbMATH Open1192.68033OpenAlexW2075113319MaRDI QIDQ3579231FDOQ3579231

Authors: Piotr Krysta, Berthold Vöcking, Artur Czumaj 

Publication date: 5 August 2010

Published in: Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/3319/1/WRAP_Cjumaz_Selfish_traffic.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)

Cited In (19)

• The Influence of Link Restrictions on (Random) Selfish Routing
• Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria
• Utilitarian resource assignment
• Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions
• Connectivity and equilibrium in random games
• On spectrum sharing games
• Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users
• The path player game
• Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
• Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria
• On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
• Non-cooperative tree creation
• A network pricing game for selfish traffic
• Selfish unsplittable flows
• The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost
• A new model for selfish routing
• Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines
• Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

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