Selfish traffic allocation for server farms

DOI10.1145/509907.509952MaRDI QIDQ3579231zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Piotr Krysta, Berthold Vöcking, Artur Czumaj

Publication date 5 August 2010

Published in Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/3319/1/WRAP_Cjumaz_Selfish_traffic.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)

Cited in

(20)

• The path player game
• Non-cooperative tree creation
• A network pricing game for selfish traffic
• Evolutionary equilibrium in Bayesian routing games: specialization and niche formation
• On spectrum sharing games
• On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
• Tradeoffs in worst-case equilibria
• Selfish unsplittable flows
• Nonpreemptive coordination mechanisms for identical machines
• Extending the notion of rationality of selfish agents: second order Nash equilibria
• The Influence of Link Restrictions on (Random) Selfish Routing
• Connectivity and equilibrium in random games
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
• On the inefficiency of atomic splittable routing games over parallel links
• Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users
• Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
• The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost
• Utilitarian resource assignment
• A new model for selfish routing
• Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions

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