Game-theoretic analysis of Internet switching with selfish users

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2012.05.029zbMath1247.68026OpenAlexW2084461307MaRDI QIDQ714792

Stefano Leonardi, Alexander Kesselman

Publication date: 11 October 2012

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2012.05.029

zbMATH Keywords

drop policyInternet switchingselfish users

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems (68M20) Internet topics (68M11)

Related Items (3)

A penalty method for generalized Nash equilibrium problems ⋮ A barrier function method for generalized Nash equilibrium problems ⋮ Generalized Nash equilibrium problems and Newton methods

Cites Work

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• On the existence of equilibria in noncooperative optimal flow control
• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Routing into two parallel links: Game-theoretic distributed algorithms

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