Automata, Languages and Programming

DOI10.1007/b99859zbMath1098.91079MaRDI QIDQ5466475

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Akash Nanavati

Publication date: 24 August 2005

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/b99859

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C47: Minimax problems in mathematical programming

91A43: Games involving graphs

68M20: Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems

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